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Abstract  
The purpose of this article is to analyse the division of domestic tasks within the couple according to 
their marital status as well as how this has changed since the 1980s based on three INSEE time-use 
surveys (1985-86, 1998-99 and 2009-10). The ordinary least squares (OLS) method is complemented 
by the matching method, which is used to account for the self-selection of the couples in terms of their 
observable characteristics in different forms of union (marriage, cohabitation and civil partnerships for 
2009-10). In 1985-86 and in 1998-99, the degree of the sexual division of labour was higher for 
married couples than for cohabiting couples. For 1985-1986, this difference is explained by 
differences in the characteristics of the couples who were cohabiting. However, by the late 1990s 
cohabiting couples had opted for an organization that was less unequal than that of married couples, 
all else being equal. For 2009-10, the average amount of domestic work performed by women was 
about the same whether they were cohabiting or married (72% and 73.5%), but the level was 
significantly lower for women in civil partnerships (65.1%). These differences are not due to 
differences in the observable characteristics of the couples based on the type of union. The article 
shows that this difference is due to a process of the couples’ self-selection based on their values: in 
2009-10, civil partnerships attracted more “egalitarian” couples who, prior to the introduction of civil 
partnerships, had opted to cohabit. 
 
Key words: Sexual division of labour, marital status, family economics, time-use survey, matching 
method. 
JEL codes: J12, J22. 
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Introduction 
In France, the specialized model of the married couple along the lines of the male breadwinner model 
has been marginalized by the increase in the ranks of working women since the 1960s. But this shift 
was not accompanied by an equal rebalancing of the sexual division of labour in domestic production: 
on average, women perform 71% of the housework (cleaning, cooking, laundry) and 65% of the 
family work (Champagne, Pailhé and Solaz, 2015). While the time women spend on domestic work 
has decreased since the 1980s, the amount men spend has remained stable. An analysis of the division 
of labour within couples, not averaged over the population, helps to refine these trends. Indeed, 
women in couples perform more housework and family work than do other women (Roy, 2012). The 
arrival of children reinforces the unequal sharing of tasks within the couple, even though fathers are 
devoting more time to the children, as the amount spent by mothers has also increased since the 1980s 
(Régnier-Loilier et Hiron, 2010; Champagne, Pailhé et Solaz, 2015; Ricroch, 2012). 
Alongside the persistence of the sexual division of labour within couples, the rise of cohabitation and 
divorce has further destabilized the model of the specialized married couple. These trends reflect the 
growth of individualism and the recourse to different types of arrangements, ranging from autonomy 
to communal life (De Singly, 2007). Since the 1990s, cohabitation is no longer the preserve of the 
younger generations, and is now a socially accepted form of union. The arrival of a child does not 
systematically lead to marriage, although some couples do eventually marry after living together for 
several years (Toulemon, 1996). Today, one out of every two children is born to a cohabiting couple. 
France ranks alongside Sweden and Denmark among the European countries with the highest 
percentage of children born outside marriage (Prioux, 2009). But unlike the Nordic countries, where 
marriage and cohabitation are regulated (Sanchez Gassen and Perelli-Harris, 2015), in France 
cohabitation is still not very institutionalized (Martin and Théry, 2001). The “Civil Solidarity Pact” 
[Pacte civil de solidarité – PACS] introduced in 1999 provides a legal framework that is intermediary 
between cohabitation and marriage. 
The various forms of union (marriage, cohabitation and civil partnerships) can be distinguished by the 
level of regulation applied to them. The legal framework for marriage guarantees protection and 
compensation for women’s overinvestment in family and domestic tasks compared to men (including 
certain family benefits associated with pension rights and a compensatory allowance). In case of 
divorce, these protections limit the impact of the sexual division of labour on women's standard of 
living. Despite this, the fall in the standard of living after a divorce is greater for women than for men 
(Bonnet, Garbinti and Solaz, 2016; Martin and Périvier, 2015). There is, however, no special 
protection for cohabiting couples. The preference given to marriage implies that couples who are not 
united before the law cannot claim special state assistance (except for transfers concerning children) 
(Martin and Théry, 2001). 
The relationship between the sexual division of labour in couples and their marital status has not been 
studied much in the economic and sociological literature pertaining to France. Yet it raises important 
questions about how well the social welfare system (social, fiscal and legal) corresponds to marital 
behaviour and the influence of gender norms. Given that the sexual division of labour continues to 
exist within cohabiting couples, the hierarchy in the regulation of different types of union (marriage, 
civil partnerships and cohabitation) could affect gender equality, particularly in cases of separation. 
The purpose of this article is to analyse the extent of the sexual division of labour according to 
couples’ marital status and determine how the division of domestic work has changed since the 1980s, 
based on three INSEE time-use surveys (1985-86, 1998-99 and 2009-10). The point is to identify the 
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factors that explain differences in terms of the organization of work based on marital status. The first 
section is devoted to a review of the international literature on the determinants of both marital choices 
and the division of labour within couples. The case of France in terms of the regulation of 
relationships is examined in detail. The second section presents descriptive statistics as well as the 
results of an econometric analysis conducted using two methods. The sexual division of labour is 
measured by the share of domestic work performed by women within the couple. The various 
relationship statuses used are marriage, cohabitation and civil partnerships for the years 2009-10. A 
cross-sectional analysis is performed, as the data do not permit following a couple over the years. 
However, the use of the “Decisions within the couples” [Décisions dans les couples] module specific 
to the 2009-10 survey is used to integrate variables related to individual marital trajectories (including 
the length of the union) and to confirm the results. 
In 1985-86 and in 1998-99, the sexual division of labour was more extensive for married couples 
(80.9% in 1985-86, 82.2% in 1998-99) than for cohabiting couples (75.1% in 1985-86, 75.1% in 1998-
99). For 1985-86, the gap is explained by differences in observable characteristics between the two 
types of union. However, in the late 1990s, cohabiting couples opted for a less unequal organization 
than did married couples, all else being equal. While at the beginning of the period, cohabitation was 
often a “prelude to marriage” (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1990), by the late 1990s it had become a 
widespread and socially accepted alternative to marriage (Toulemon, 1996; Prioux, 2009). For the 
2009-10 period, the average domestic work performed by women is about the same whether they 
cohabit or are married (72% and 73.5%), but it is significantly lower for women in civil partnerships 
(65.1%). These differences are not due to differences in the observable characteristics of couples based 
on the type of union. Two non-exclusive interpretations are possible. A “marital status” effect could 
explain the different extents of the sexual division of labour by type of union, even without 
determining the direction of causality: marriage could encourage couples to specialize, or role 
specialization could lead couples to marry due to the protection associated with this type of union. 
This does not explain the unequal division of labour observed in 2009-10 within cohabiting couples. A 
phenomenon involving the self-selection of couples that takes place based on values, unobserved and 
not available in the data, could explain the dynamics seen in the three surveys used: in 2009-10, civil 
partnerships would attract the most egalitarian couples in terms of their gender ideology, while prior to 
the introduction of the PAC civil partnerships these couples opted for cohabitation. 
 
1. Specialization of couples and marital status: a review of the literature  
 
1.1. Why do couples specialize? 
Family economics provides an analytical framework for understanding the sexual division of labour 
within couples based on the relative resources of the two partners. In the neoclassical approach, a 
couple is the association of two individuals who pool their spending and resources. The gains2 from 
living as a couple come from economies of scale relative to living alone and to a division of labour 
between domestic production and market production. A decision to live together is the result of a 
comparison of all the gains accruing to the partners relative to those accruing to a single person 
(Browning, Chiappori and Weiss, 2014). Several theoretical approaches have been developed to 
explain how couples organize their respective work and how the surplus generated by living together 
                                                          
2 In the theoretical literature underpinning family economics, the different forms of union are not often distinguished. 
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is shared. Becker (1973, 1981) relies on a utility function common to the couple (called the “unitary” 
model) that is maximized by a “benevolent despot” for the household as a whole, under a budget 
constraint grouping all the family’s resources. Assuming a comparative advantage in domestic 
production for women, the model predicts that the mode of production of goods and services in the 
most efficient family is gendered specialization.3 This model has been criticized theoretically (see 
especially Bustreel, 2001) and empirically (see in particular Fortin and Lacroix, 1997; Browning and 
Chiappori, 1998; Cherchye and Vermeulen, 2008; Cherchye et al., 2009; Ponthieux, 2012). 
 
Other studies have looked at the individual preferences of the partners and their bargaining power 
within the household. In bargaining models, the threat point is a “divorce”, understood as a breakdown 
of the couple, without specifying the marital status of the union (Manser and Brown, 1980). In non-
cooperative collective models, the threat point is based on the intra-household distribution of 
resources, and the threat is that of a non-cooperative equilibrium within the marriage that reflects 
gender norms (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993, 1994). Finally, cooperative collective models are based on 
a rule for sharing resources between household members (Chiappori, 1988; Bourguignon and 
Chiappori, 1992; Alderman et al., 1995; Behrman, 1997). Bargaining power influences the degree of 
specialization of labour within the couple, based on the actual or potential contribution of each partner 
to income. The public transfers granted to the couple during their life together also alter the relative 
bargaining power of the partners. Similarly, the consequences of a breakdown for each of the partners 
(as well as the degree of competitiveness in the marriage market and the state of the labour market) 
and the terms of a potential rupture, which depend in particular on the legal context specific to each 
type of union (for example, the right to a compensatory allowance in case of a divorce), also affect the 
bargaining power. 
 
Among the empirical approaches, some studies evaluate the effect of the paid work of both partners on 
the distribution of domestic work. Women working full-time contribute less to the domestic work than 
women who are inactive or working part-time, and dual-earner couples are more egalitarian in terms 
of sharing domestic work (Gershuny, 2000). Men who spend less time in paid work spend more time 
on domestic work (Bianchi et al., 2000). When both partners work full time, the distribution of 
domestic and family work becomes less unequal as the woman’s salary climbs, but women still 
perform a larger share than do their partners (Ponthieux and Schreiber, 2006). 
 
Finally, an approach based on gender ideology and gender norms nuances the connection between 
economic exchanges and the sexual division of labour. Gender ideology can be measured using a scale 
ranging from upholding an egalitarian organization of the couple (people favourable to sharing 
domestic and family responsibilities) to upholding a conservative organization of the couple (people 
favourable to the male breadwinner model). Men who have egalitarian values are more involved in 
housework than men with conservative values (Greenstein, 2000). Finally, the theory of “gender 
deviance neutralization” is based on the fact that gender norms influence the sexual division of labour 
via the everyday construction of identity. Men perform so-called “masculine” tasks and reject the so-
called “feminine”. Men who are financially dependent on their partners compensate for this deviance 
from gender norms by investing less in domestic chores. For the same reasons, women working full-
time tend to increase their contribution to domestic duties if their partner loses his job (Brines, 1994; 
Greenstein, 2000; Evertsson and Nermo, 2004). Other studies have nevertheless shown the fragility 
and lack of robustness of these approaches. It turns out that the injunction to perform gender  on 
                                                          
3 To explain the gendered nature of specialization, Becker uses the biological differences between the sexes: women returning 
from pregnancy have a comparative advantage in domestic production in general. 
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decisions to share housework within couples has less impact than the relative bargaining power of 
each partner through their wages (Sullivan, 2011; England, 2011; Ponthieux and Meurs, 2015). 
 
1.2. Marital status and the division of domestic and family work 
 
The organization of the couple, marital behaviour and the degree of institutionalization of the various 
possible statuses of couples are linked and depend in particular on social perceptions associated with 
each type of union. According to the typology of Heuveline and Timberlake (2004), cohabitation can 
be a prelude to marriage, as in the Central European countries. It attracts young couples without 
children, and amounts to a stage in the life cycle and in life as a couple, with these couples eventually 
marrying. The domestic division of labour varies little with marital status. This situation closely 
resembles cohabitation in France in the early 1980s (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1990; Toulemon, 1996). 
Cohabitation can be an alternative to living alone and can correspond to an unstable form of union, as 
in the Anglo-American countries. The partners do not share household tasks, nor do they specialize 
(Bianchi et al., 2014; Kalenkoski et al., 2007). Cohabitation can represent an alternative based on a 
rejection of marriage view as a patriarchal institution, as in the southern European countries, 
particularly Italy. Here it is a form of marginalized union that is socially stigmatized and unregulated. 
It attracts individuals with a specific profile, in particular women with a high educational level who are 
unattached to family traditions with partners who hold to egalitarian values. In Italy, cohabiting 
women have a higher labour force participation rate than married women, and the volume of domestic 
and family work they perform is much lower than that done by married women: the division of 
housework and family work in cohabiting couples is significantly less unequal than in married couples 
(Bianchi et al, 2014; Dominguez-Folgueras, 2012). Finally, cohabitation may be an alternative type of 
union that is not particularly distinguished from marriage and is widely accepted socially, as in the 
Scandinavian countries. Cohabiting couples have rights similar to those granted to married couples 
(Sanchez Gassen and Perelli-Harris, 2015), and the organization within the couple is less specialized 
than in other countries (Davies, Greenstein and Mark, 2007).  
 
To a greater or lesser extent, depending on the country, cohabiting couples adopt patterns of sharing 
domestic and family work that are more egalitarian than married couples (Dominguez-Folgueras, 
2012; Davies, Greenstein and Mark, 2007), with regulations4 that vary in accordance with the different 
types of union (Sanchez Gassen and Perelli-Harris, 2015). The causal relationship between the 
couple’s marital status and their specialization, hereinafter called the “marital status” effect, is 
undetermined in an a priori sense. Couples can specialize after marrying in response to the social 
protections and transfers associated with marriage. In this case, the regulatory framework for marriage 
offers an incentive for couples to specialize; women are encouraged to focus on housework and family 
tasks and men on the public sphere. Couples can also specialize and then marry in order to receive the 
protection afforded to their organization. From this perspective, marriage is a response to the couple’s 
specialization. The “marriage” institution would then be viewed as an insurance system that 
guarantees the protection and commitment of the working partner, the man, to the partner who 
specializes in domestic work, the woman. This protection extends beyond the union itself, with a right 
to a compensatory allowance in case of divorce. The two relationships do not exclude one another: it is 
possible that couples begin to specialize before marriage (especially with the arrival of a child), then 
marry as a result, reinforcing the specialization. Barg and Beblo (2012) showed that German couples 
who anticipate a gender specialization in roles marry, and then the marriage consolidates this 
                                                          
4 The term “regulation” refers to all policies pertaining to the couple (the couple’s fiscal and social welfare rights and the rights 
and duties between the partners – see Périvier, 2015). 
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specialization. The tendency of married couples in Germany to specialize more than cohabiting 
couples do is mainly due to differences in the observable characteristics of these couples and to their 
greater likelihood of having a child. 
 
Socio-economic factors thus condition both the division of labour within the couple and the choice of 
marital status; this phenomenon is referred to hereafter as the “observable characteristics” effect.5 The 
greater specialization of married couples with respect to cohabiting couples observed in many 
countries may be due to differences in the observable characteristics of the two partners that are more 
or less favourable to specialization (educational level, salary, etc.). In this case it can be expected that 
in the cohabiting couples the women are more educated and better integrated into the labour market 
than the married women, as this form of union offers less protection (Kiernan, 2002).  
 
Economic resources alone cannot explain the sexual division of labour based on the type of union: 
married women bear a greater burden of the domestic work compared to cohabiting women, regardless 
of their respective incomes (Lück and Hofacker, 2003; Landwerlin, 2005). Married couples behave 
more in accordance with the roles assigned to the partners by gender norms, and specialize more than 
do unmarried couples (Shelton and John, 1993). Likewise, wedding ceremonies reinforce the couple’s 
behaviour in line with the social norms associated with marriage and widen the differences in the 
degree of specialization between the two types of union (Kalmijn, 2004). Thus, the values upheld by 
the two members of the couple are also a selection factor. This phenomenon is hereafter called the 
“value” effect: couples who favour equality between women and men tend to reject the institution of 
marriage and opt for alternative forms of union. The two forms of self-selection of couples in the 
different unions (observable characteristics on the one hand and values on the other) are linked: for 
example, in the most educated couples the partners share more egalitarian norms (Dominguez-
Folgueras, 2012).  
 
This literature review indicates that the institutional environment specific to each type of union (social 
protections and economic benefits granted to married couples) or the meaning given to cohabitation 
and the spread of this type of union explain the differences across countries. The following sections 
explore this issue more deeply in France. Does the organization of work in couples differ in 
accordance with marital status? Do the couples opting for one or the other form of union differ in 
terms of their observable characteristics, or is their choice related to the more or less egalitarian values 
that both partners hold? 
 
                                                          
5 Oppenheimer (2003) found that in the United States men’s educational level has a positive impact on the probability of a first 
marriage and on the transition from cohabitation to marriage.     
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1.3. The French case:  a challenge for equality  
In France, as in many countries, the welfare system and the family law were built on the basis of a 
specialization in the roles of partners (Badel, Gilles, Laborde and Subrenat, 2003; Périvier, 2015). Fiscal 
and social redistribution aimed at supporting specialized married couples and limiting the opportunities for 
women’s economic empowerment. This institutionalized family model in part endorsed a situation 
characterized by this specialization of couples. In this way, the welfare state guaranteed protection for 
married women and compensation for their investment in family and household duties (for example, 
survivors' benefits, rights and duties between the partners with compensation provided in case of divorce). 
But this framework was also an instrument promoting the specialized married couple by making it 
financially accessible to all households (with in particular the system of the marital allowance that benefits 
married couples with large earnings gaps between the partners). 
 
Starting from the 1970s, the male breadwinner model based on the married couple has been marginalized 
by women’s entry into the labour force, the decline of marriage, the rise of cohabitation, and the 
increasing number of divorces (see in particular INSEE, 2015). These trends are the result of greater 
individual freedom with respect to family institutions: the family, though still a reference entity, has 
become a place of “self-revelation” (De Singly, 2007). But these changes have not resulted in an overhaul 
of the regulation of unions and their breakups, which raises issues about gender equality. 
 
With respect to the rise in divorces, the legal framework of marriage has not been sufficient to offset the 
loss in living standards experienced by the former spouses after a divorce, even though maintenance 
obligations (right to a compensatory allowance) and related rights (survivor benefits) have helped to limit 
the impact. Despite this, after a divorce or the end of a civil partnership, women’s standard of living falls 
by 19%, compared with 2.5% for men, and this is only partly offset by government transfers and the return 
to employment of divorced women who were inactive during their marriage (Bonnet, Garbinti and Solaz, 
2016). In the case of splitting up, then, the cost of the sexual division of labour during marriage weighs 
more heavily on the woman’s standard of living than on the man’s (Martin and Périvier, 2015). 
 
Since the late 1990s, cohabitation has been a socially accepted mode of union, and the arrival of a child no 
longer triggers a marriage. In France, as in the Nordic countries, the proportion of children born outside 
marriage is among the highest in Europe. But the differences in social, tax and legal regulations between 
the two forms of union are much more marked in France than in the Nordic countries. Cohabitation is not 
subject to any kind of compensation or obligation towards the partner who specializes in domestic 
production and family work, even partially.6 If the partnership ends, the risk associated with the sexual 
division of labour for cohabiting couples is then borne entirely by the woman (also if the partner dies 
during retirement). 
 
The creation of civil partnerships has partly and gradually incorporated some protections initially reserved 
for marriage (Table 1). Martin and Théry (2001) explain this reluctance to treat cohabitation as a fully 
distinct form of union by fear of the rise of individualism and by the fact that no claim from cohabiting 
                                                          
6 In borderline legal situations, the concrete situations can be taken into account in case of separation. 
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couples has been accepted as a counterbalance, for example in terms of the right to a compensatory 
allowance in case of separation. The introduction of civil partnerships is a symptom of the rejection of 
cohabitation as a form of union with rights and duties: “no duties, thus no rights with respect to the 
welfare state” (Martin and Théry,2001). 
 
Understanding the sexual division of labour in couples in relation to their marital status is thus an 
important issue for equality between men and women. The few studies available show that women 
perform more domestic work than men regardless of whether they are married or cohabiting. Similarly, 
the paid working hours of married women and cohabiting women are roughly the same (within 4 minutes) 
(Bianchi et al., 2014). These studies focus on individual averages calculated on all the people living in 
couples. Dominguez-Folgueras (2012) found that in France unmarried couples are more egalitarian than 
married couples with regard to the distribution of domestic chores, but the data used (MTUS7) does not 
make it possible to distinguish between cohabiting couples and couples in civil partnerships. 
 
This article examines this matter in greater depth by looking at couples, and not individuals, to show the 
links between the sexual division of labour and marital status in France. Taking account of civil 
partnerships as a form of union distinct from marriage and cohabitation helps to clarify the existing 
literature with respect to behaviour in terms of the division of labour within couples. Time-use surveys 
from 1985-86, 1998-99 and 2009-10 are used to explore changes in behaviour within couples based on 
marital status. For the year 2009-10, the “Decisions within couples” module [Décisions dans les couples] 
specific to this survey is used to refine the results. 
 
 
Table 1: Social protection and legal and fiscal programmes for different types of union in France 
 Marriage Civil partnership (PACS) Cohabitation 
Formality - Act performed before a civil 
registrar 
- In the absence of a prior marriage 
contract, the spouses are married 
under the legal regime of 
community property limited to 
acquired assets 
- Joint declaration before 
the Court Clerk (or civil 
partnership agreement 
before a Notary Public) 
 
- Cohabitation without 
formality 
Obligations - Material aid and reciprocal assistance 
- Contribution to the marriage burden in proportion to respective 
capabilities 
- Joint solidarity for current debts 
- No obligation  
Income tax   - Common taxation with joint solidarity of the spouses or partners for 
payment (since 2005 for civil partnerships; before 2005 separate 
taxation during the first 3 years of partnership then joint) 
- Separate taxation 
- No joint solidarity  
ISF wealth tax - Joint taxation - Joint taxation in case of 
declared cohabitation  
Inheritance rights - The surviving spouse inherits in full 
and benefits from a right to the 
home  
- Civil partners do not 
inherit from one another: a 
will is necessary 
- Temporary right to the 
home 
- Cohabitants do not inherit 
from one another: a will is 
necessary  
                                                          
7 Multinational Time Use Surveys. 
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Transfer duties - Exemption from inheritance tax (since 2008 for civil partnerships) 
- For a gift of current goods, abatement and then application of a 
progressive tax rate (from 5% to 45%) 
- No exemption on 
inheritance tax  
- Transfer duty of 60% after 
abatement  
Health insurance and 
social security 
- A partner without their own social security coverage benefits from their partner’s coverage, regardless of 
marital status  
- Conditional right to survivor’s benefit 
Pension rights - Conditional right of the widow or 
widower to a survivor’s pension  
- No right to a survivor’s pension  
Divorce / Dissolution - Divorce pronounced legally by a 
judge in the family court  
- Grant of a compensatory allowance 
intended to correct disparities in 
living standards related to the 
divorce 
   
- Mutually agreed 
termination (Notary 
Public) or unilateral 
(bailiff) 
- No compensatory 
allowance 
- The civil partnership 
terminates upon marriage  
- Termination freely 
- No compensatory 
allowance 
  
Source: Jurisdefi, La vie du réseau, March 2013, no. 5 
 
 
 
 
2. The sexual division of labour in the couple according to marital status 
 
2.1. What changes between 1985-86, 1998-99 and 2009-10? 
For the 1985-86 and 1998-99 surveys, two types of couples are distinguished: married couples and 
cohabiting couples. Since the PACS law on civil partnerships was passed in 1999, the 2009-10 survey 
added PACS couples. Married couples are those who declare their marital status to be “married” (or 
“remarried”), PACS couples are those who say they have entered a civil partnership, and cohabiting 
couples are couples who live together but have not declared themselves married or in civil partnerships. 
Given that there is no longitudinal data, it is impossible to follow the marital “trajectory” of the couples. 
This means that the grouping of couples by type of union ignores the past unions of each partner. Marital 
status is seen in a cross-sectional view, and therefore the couples used in the samples include individuals 
who may have previously been married or living in cohabitation with another partner or in a civil 
partnership, including with the same person with whom they were married at the time of the survey (a 
detailed breakdown of the samples used for each type of union is presented in Table A2.1, Annex 2). 
 
********************************************************************************* 
Text box 
The time-use surveys, the data and the work samples 
 
The three INSEE time-use surveys for 1985-86, 1998-99 and 2009-10 were conducted over 12 months in 
metropolitan France, and include: 
- A questionnaire describing the household composition, 
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- A questionnaire on the person surveyed, 
- An individual activity diary (broken down by segment of 5 minutes for 1985-86 and 10 minutes for the 
two other surveys). 
For the 1985-86 and 1998-99 surveys, the individuals complete a diary for each day of the week (which 
can be a day of the week or of the weekend). For the 2009-10 survey, each individual can fill out a diary 
for a weekday except the weekend and a diary for one day of the weekend. When an individual is 
surveyed, this necessarily implies that it is possible that the partner will be too8, and both partners fill out 
their diary on the same day. 
The sample used for the analysis includes households for which: 
- The reference person lives as part of a couple with another member of the household.9  
- The household includes only adult couples (with or without children): more complex households, 
with other housemates (accommodation of parents or relatives) are excluded from the analysis. 
- At least one member of the couple is working. Also excluded are couples in which one partner 
cannot work (student, retired, disabled, etc.). 
- Only couples in which both partners have filled in the diaries are retained (these notebooks can be 
filled for a day of the work week or weekend). 
- Only couples in which both partners are between age 25 and 55 are included. 
- Same-sex couples are excluded. Their low representation in the databases makes it impossible to 
control for the econometric analysis. 
 
The samples used for the descriptive statistics include 3334 couples for 1985-86, 2761 for 1998-99 and 
2875 for 2009-10. Couples and individuals for whom some variables needed to conduct the econometric 
analysis were not filled in were eliminated, so that the 1998-99 survey and the 2009-10 survey had 
samples of 2715 and 2873 couples respectively. 
Intermediate domestic work includes the following activities: sewing, shopping, repairing, gardening and 
fishing. Core domestic work includes the following activities: cooking, dishwashing, laundry, putting 
away, management, trips, child care, adult care, and miscellaneous. The nomenclature of activities related 
to core domestic work and the perimeter used for the analysis are detailed for the three surveys in Table 
A1 (Annex). 
********************************************************************** 
The scope of domestic work used for the analysis includes the most burdensome everyday domestic 
activities: cooking, dishwashing, laundry, putting away and cleaning, household management, trips, caring 
for children, caring for adults, and miscellaneous.10 This is the definition used by Roy (2012). This rules 
out tasks considered intermediate or semi-leisure: sewing, repairing, gardening, fishing, etc. 
                                                          
8 In practice, it is common for one partner not to fill in the diary properly, which requires not using these couples in the sample insofar 
as it concerns the total domestic labour time performed by the couple; this leads to attrition. 
9 Only the 2009-10 time use survey has a variable relative to the fact that the partners have lived together for over a year, and this 
variable has not been filled in well: not retaining the couples for which the value is missing would have led to reducing the sample 
size by 1108 couples. The “decision in the couples” module, which includes a variable relating to the duration of the union, is used 
for the year 2009-10 in order to confirm the results. 
10 Maintenance of heating and water, other household maintenance work, moving house. 
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Regardless of the reporting year, the share performed by women declines as their level of education rises. 
Conversely, as men’s educational level rises, so does the share of the domestic work that they perform 
(Figures 2a and 2b). This is consistent with the results of other studies on this subject (Anxo, 2002; 
Bianchi et al., 2000; Gershuny, 2000). Furthermore, the total domestic workload decreases with the 
couple's income, which is due to outsourcing a greater share of that work (by e.g. employing a 
housekeeper). 
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Table 2 shows changes in the weekly time spent on domestic work and paid work by women and men 
living in couples, according to their marital status11. The time spent on domestic work by cohabiting 
women has fallen over 25 years (1h21 per week) but that of married women fell even more sharply (down 
5h44 per week); the gap between the two has fallen from 5h21 in 1985-86 to 58 minutes in 2009-10. The 
difference between the hours spent in paid work by married women and by cohabiting women has also 
fallen significantly, from 1h20 in 1998-99 to 17 minutes in 2009-10. 
 
Finally, the time spent by women on domestic tasks is inversely related to the time they devote to paid 
work: in 2009-10, an unemployed woman spent an average of a little more than 27 hours per week on 
domestic tasks (i.e. 85% of the domestic work done in the couple) against a little more than 18 hours 
(75%) for a woman working part time, and 15 hours 30 minutes for one working full time (70%).12 This 
                                                          
11 The data from the three surveys are not strictly comparable (Brousse, 2015). 
12 In 1998-99, an unemployed woman spent on average just under 30 hours a week on domestic work (i.e. 90% of the domestic work 
done by the couple) against more than 20 hours for a woman working part-time (83%), and over 17 hours for a woman working full-
time (78%). In 1985-86, an unemployed woman spent an average of just over 32 hours per week on domestic work (89% of the 
domestic work done by the couple) against a little more than 21 hours for a woman working part-time (80%), and slightly more than 
18 hours for full-time women workers (76%). 
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trend also holds for men, but for much lower amounts of time: in 2009-10, a man in full-time work spent 
an average of six hours 30 minutes on housework, less than half that of a woman working full time. 
 
With regard to the share of the domestic work performed by women in the 1980s and 1990s, the gap 
between married couples and cohabiting couples was substantial (Figure 2): on average, women in 
married couples performed 80.9% in 1985-86 (82.2% in 19-99) of domestic tasks against 75.1% in 1985-
86 (75.1% in 1998-99) for women in cohabiting couples. However, in 2009-10, the share of domestic 
work performed by women is much the same, whether married (73.5%) or cohabiting (72%). This 
convergence is the result of two separate trends: the share carried out by women has declined significantly 
in married couples, which is part of a general downward trend in the time women spend on domestic 
work. Thus the extent of the sexual division of labour in married couples grew closer to the level in 
cohabiting couples. Simultaneously, the introduction of civil partnerships in 1999 changed the institutional 
context: women in partnerships are the ones who perform the lowest share of domestic work (65.1%). The 
men in partnerships carry out 2 hours and 28 minutes more housework than married men, compared with a 
gap of only 2 minutes between married men and cohabiting men. Married men spend 1 hour and 13 
minutes more in paid work than do men in civil partnerships. Men in partnerships spend more time on 
family life than either married or cohabiting men. 
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Table 2 : 
 
Civil 
partners
Marriage/civil 
prtnrs diff.
1985-86 1998-99 2009-10 1985-86 1998-99 2009-10 2009-10 1985-86 1998-99 2009-10 2009-10
Paid work of the woman 34h38min 32h21min 33h57min 36h50min 33h41min 34h14min 34h47min -2h12min -1h20min -17min -50 min
Woman's share of paid work (in %) 44,9 45,6 45,8 47,4 46,8 46,4 46,8 -2.5 % pt -1,2 pts -0,6 pts de % -1 % pt
Domestic work performed by the woman 23h23min 20h47min 17h39min 18h02min 17h38min 16h41min 15h45min 5h21min 3h09min 58min 1h54min
Share of domestic work performed by the woman (in 
%) 
80,9 82,2 73,5 75,1 75,1 72 65,1 5,8 % pt 7,1 % pt 1,5  % pt 8,4 % pt
Total number of couples 3091 2240 2014 243 521 683 178
Sources: Time-use surveys, 1985-86, 1998-99, 2009-10, Insee.
Scope: Couples cohabiting in which two members have filled out the diaries and at least one of whom is active.
Averages per week
Marriage Cohabiting Marriage/cohabiting difference
Paid work of the man 41h39min 38h4min 40h18min 40h47min 37h41min 39h14min 39h05min  1h13 min52min 23min 1h04min
Domestic work performed by the man 5h12min 4h34min 6h26min 5h40min 5h38min 6h28min 8h54min -2h28-28min -1h04min -2min
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These differences are due in part to differences in the profiles of couples according to the type of union. 
Some forms of union can attract individuals with specific characteristics in terms for example of 
educational level, salary, or number of dependent children. Individuals in civil partnerships are more 
qualified than those in other types of couples, and they are younger (Annex 2, Table A2.2). These 
differences may explain why civil partnerships were more egalitarian than married couples or cohabiting 
couples in 2009-10. 
 
 
2.2 An estimate of the share of domestic work carried out by the woman 
 
The descriptive statistics indicate that the distribution of domestic work as well as the volume performed 
in couples is sensitive to the characteristics of the individual members of the couple (level of education, 
employment status of the two partners, type of occupation, etc.). Similarly, the household composition 
(number of children, for example) is an important factor. To compare the degree of specialization of the 
couples based on marital status, all else being equal, the share of domestic work performed by the woman 
in the couple is estimated for the three time-use surveys, initially using the ordinary least squares (OLS) 
method. The sample is the one used for the descriptive statistics (box). 
The variable to be explained is the share of domestic work performed by the woman in the couple. It is 
defined as the ratio between the domestic work time spent by the woman and the domestic work time 
spent by both members of the couple. The explanatory variables include the individual characteristics and 
couple characteristics (Table 3). The reference couple is a married couple, both working full time, both 
with an educational level of less than the French Bac high school diploma, with no dependent children and 
residing in an urban area. The results obtained are interpreted in relation to this reference. 
Some diaries are filled in for one weekend day and others one weekday. But the use of time and its 
distribution between partners vary between weekends and weekdays. To take this into account, an 
indicator used to control for the type of day during which the notebook was filled out was introduced into 
the estimate. For the 2009-10 survey, the diary variable is set to 1 if the partners completed their 
respective diary on a weekday (2 diaries per household), the value 2 if the two partners completed their 
respective diary on the weekend (2 diaries per household)13 and the value 3 if one partner has filled in two 
diaries and the other one (3 diaries per household). The reference is the situation in which both partners 
each filled in two diaries (so 4 diaries for the household). For the 1985-86 and 1998-99 surveys, the 
“weekend” variable is set to 1 if the diaries were filled in on the weekend. Regardless of the year of 
observation, the share of domestic work performed by the woman is lower on weekends, as men are more 
involved on weekends. 
Likewise, the estimates indicate that the amount of domestic work performed by women declines as the 
level of household income rises. Couples with higher incomes outsource more domestic tasks, especially 
                                                          
13 The partners fill out their individual diary on the same day. 
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those carried out by women (cleaning and laundry in particular)14. The variables related to household 
equipment and appliances indicate that in 1985-86, having a washing machine cut the share of domestic 
work performed by women by 4.3 percentage points: without a washing machine, laundry, a task 
performed mainly by women, is a time-consuming activity. In 1998-99 and 2009-10, this variable lost its 
significance, which is due to the increase in the levels of household equipment: by the late 1990s, most 
households with the characteristics of the sample have a washing machine. 
The bargaining power of each member of the couple is approximated by the relative wages of the two 
partners.15 The introduction of this variable is based on bargaining models (section 1) and relies on 
statistical analysis, including that of Ponthieux and Schreiber (2006), which indicates that the share of 
domestic and family work performed by the woman in couples who are both full-time employees is in 
inverse relation to her salary. The bargaining power is defined as the wage gap between the partners 
relative to the sum of the two salaries16. By definition, the wages of non-working women are not observed. 
A wage equation that takes into account selection on the labour market was estimated in order to assign 
these women a potential salary (see the results of the estimation in Appendix 3, Table A317). This 
corresponds to the salary that these women could claim based on their observable characteristics 
(educational degree, past work experience, etc.); the state of the labour market is not taken into account, 
although it could reduce the level of the potential wages of non-working women and their actual ability to 
get a job if they were searching for one. The woman performs a smaller share of the domestic work 
whenever her bargaining power in the couple increases. This effect is significant only for 2009-10. 
                                                          
14 The non-significant effect of variables related to the use of paid outside help for 2009-10 is explained by the fact that the 
information provided by this variable is redundant with that for the level of income. 
15 Other parameters influence the bargaining power of the members of the couple, including the state of the labour market and the 
legal and institutional context. This latter partly determines the financial terms governing the breakdown of a couple and thus alters 
the bargaining power of each member.  
16 Two variants were tested: one in which the bargaining power is defined as the ratio between the hourly pay of the woman and the 
sum of the hourly wages of the couple, and the other by an indicator variable that equals 1 if the man’s salary is more than twice the 
level of his partner. The different ways of integrating the relative bargaining power of the two members of the couple into the analysis 
do not alter the results profoundly. 
17 The information on wage income is not available for the 1985-1986 time-use survey. The variable measuring the bargaining power 
is thus not used for this survey. 
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Tablea 3: Results of LOS estimations
Share of domestic work performed by 
the woman Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err. Coef. Std. Err.
Total no. of couples
Total domestic working time -0,00005** 0,00002 -0,00011*** 0,00003 -0,00009*** 0,00003
Diaries 2009-10
1 0,004 0,009
2 -0,016 0,013
3 0,001 0,04
Weekend diary 1998-99 and 1985-86 -0,017** 0,007 -0,030*** 0,009
Revenue per uc couple 2009-10
2 -0,032** 0,013
3 -0,024* 0,014
4 -0,019 0,016
Revenue 1998-99 and 1985-86
1 -0,036*** 0,013
2 -0,040** 0,017
Recourse to a paid cleaner 2009-10 and 1998-
99 0,005 0,009 -0,001 0,009
Recourse to an unpaid cleaner 2009-10 -0,001 0,013
Recourse to a cleaner, unpaid or not, 1985-86 -0,008 0,009
Microwave 0,012 0,01 0,032** 0,015
Dishwasher -0,003 0,007 -0,008 0,009 -0,005 0,011
Washing machine -0,043* 0,023 0,034 0,036 -0,004 0,046
Inactive man -0,085** 0,034 -0,183** 0,075
Inactive woman 0,138*** 0,008 0,129*** 0,012 0,138*** 0,015
Part-time man -0,045*** 0,015 -0,080** 0,035 -0,049* 0,029
Part-time woman 0,062*** 0,01 0,051*** 0,013 0,042*** 0,014
Unemployed man -0,128*** 0,017 -0,141*** 0,019 -0,125*** 0,018
Unemployed woman 0,122*** 0,016 0,118*** 0,016 0,123*** 0,019
Bargaining power -0,039 0,035 -0,133*** 0,029
Civil partners (PACS) -0,045** 0,018
Cohabiting -0,013 0,012 -0,035*** 0,011 -0,005 0,011
Average age of couple 0,002*** 0 0,003*** 0,001 0,001* 0,001
Age difference -0,001 0,001 -0,002 0,001 -0,002** 0,001
Woman w/ high school diploma -0,025** 0,01 0,014 0,013 -0,017 0,014
Woman w/ more than high school diploma -0,030*** 0,01 -0,032** 0,015 -0,017 0,012
Man w/ high school diploma -0,038*** 0,01 -0,022 0,014 -0,066*** 0,016
Man w/ more than high school diploma -0,067*** 0,011 -0,045*** 0,015 -0,060*** 0,011
Presence of a child 0,018** 0,008 0,026** 0,011 -0,020* 0,011
Presence of a child under age 3 -0,002 0,008 0,01 0,013 0,017 0,013
Rural area 0,027*** 0,007 0,013 0,009 0,008 0,009
Constant 0,753 0,032 0,695 0,047 0,722 0,058
*** significance at threshold of < 1%, ** at threshold of < 5% and * at threshold of < 10%.
2009-101998-991985-86
3334 2715 2875
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In agreement with the literature, the paid working time of the two partners plays an important role in the 
division of the domestic work: when a member of the couple is less integrated in employment (inactivity, 
unemployment or part-time), then he or she tends to perform more of the work. The effect of having a 
single wage-earner on the amount of domestic work performed by the woman is positive and significant 
for all three surveys: in couples where the woman does not have a job, the share of domestic work she 
performs rises by about 14 percentage points. Similarly, when the man is inactive, the amount of domestic 
work performed by the woman falls, on the order of 8.5 percentage points in 1985-86 and around 
18 percentage points in 2009-1018. Over a 25-year period, a greater substitutability of social time can be 
seen for men, making gender identity potentially less important (see the literature review). The woman 
working part-time or being unemployed positively influences the amount of domestic work she performs; 
conversely, the woman’s share of domestic work decreases if the man does not work, or works part time 
or is unemployed. This additional domestic work performed by inactive men, part-time or unemployed, 
does not suffice to offset the gap in domestic work with the woman: the distribution of work continues to 
be unequal. 
As expected, men’s participation in domestic work increases with their level of education. Conversely, the 
share performed by women falls in line with their level of education. More educated women have greater 
bargaining power19, and more educated men in general have more egalitarian values (Dominguez-
Folgueras, 2012). 
 
In 1985-86 and 1998-99, the presence of children in the household significantly increased the share of 
domestic work performed by women, with an impact of around 2 percentage points. For the year 2009-10, 
this effect was reversed, as the presence of a child reduced the domestic work performed by women 
(2 percentage points). This trend reflects men’s greater investment in the family, particularly in the care of 
children.20 On the other hand, the presence of a child under age 3 did not significantly affect the woman’s 
share of domestic work: the model contains other variables that capture this effect by providing redundant 
information such as variables relating to working time, since women adjust their working time after they 
give birth (Pailhé and Solaz, 2010). 
Finally, the effect of variables related to marital status on the sexual division of labour within couples 
changes according to the survey considered. In 1985-86, the share of domestic work performed by 
cohabiting women was not significantly different from that of married women, while in 1998-99 it was 
about 3.5 percentage points lower. In 2009-10, the share of domestic work performed by cohabiting 
women did not differ significantly from that performed by married women, a result that is consistent with 
the findings of Bianchi et al. (2014), which is based on individual averages. However, all else being equal, 
the share of domestic work carried out by women in civil partnerships is about 4.5 percentage points lower 
                                                          
18 In 1998-99, only one couple was in this configuration. 
19 For the 2009-10 survey, the effect of the woman’s education is weaker and less significant than for the other two surveys, but the 
effect of the “bargaining power” variable, calculated from the relative wages of the two partners, is significant, whereas it is not in 
1998-99, and it was not introduced in 1985-86. The two variables “partner’s education” and “bargaining power” capture some of the 
same effect. 
20 Estimates made by separating the activities directly related to children indicate that this negative effect persists. 
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than married women’s share. It is possible that the more equal sharing of tasks within civil partnerships 
occurs because fathers in these partnerships are more involved than married fathers with their children. 
This would not then involve a more equal sharing in relation to gender norms but rather a different 
relationship to fatherhood. The estimates for activity excluding “child care” indicate that the share of 
domestic work performed by women in civil partnerships is 5 percentage points lower than that performed 
by married women.21 Couples in civil partnerships therefore opt for a more egalitarian distribution of 
domestic work than married couples, independently of activity directly related to their children. 
The data available in the three surveys do not allow taking account of the marital trajectory of the couples 
(number of unions preceding the one observed, type of past union, duration of the union under 
observation, etc.), even though this influences the distribution of domestic work within couples. The 
“Decisions in the couples” module supplementing the 2009-10 time use survey included questions related 
to the respondents’ marital past. The length of the relationship observed can be calculated from the date 
when the two partners met. However, as civil partnerships were introduced only in 1999, the duration for 
civil partnerships is necessarily lower than for the other types of couples. Furthermore, among couples 
who married before 1999, some would have opted for civil partnerships if that option had existed. 
Information about the number of past unions and the types of past unions is available. Nevertheless, the 
small size of the sample means that many coefficients have lost their significance. A sample of couples 
that includes only those who report not having had another union before the current one was retained. The 
effect of the length of the relationship on the share of domestic work performed by the woman is positive, 
but not significant. The effect of the civil partnership remains negative and significant at the 10% 
threshold: taking into account the observed length of the relationship, civil partnership couples are more 
egalitarian than married couples, whereas cohabiting couples are not. Ten years ago, cohabiting couples 
were more egalitarian than married couples. 
This result could reflect two phenomena. The first is the trend towards a decline in the time women spend 
on domestic work, which is documented in the literature (section 1). Thus the extent of the sexual division 
of labour in married couples is reduced and gradually converges with the level observed in cohabiting 
couples. The second is a shift in values according to marital status, which is related to the introduction of 
civil partnerships in the late 1990s. Indeed, the recourse to civil partnerships is associated with a system of 
values that is based on a less differentialist perception of social relations than in decisions to marry (Rault, 
2007; Rault and Letrait, 2010). To test this hypothesis, it is necessary to build a counterfactual to estimate 
what would have been the sexual division of labour of a married couple if this couple had opted for a civil 
partnership or cohabitation. 
 
 
 
                                                          
21 The results are not presented so as to enhance readability. 
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2.3. An estimate using the matching method  
This section is intended to clarify the results of the estimate using the OLS method. The choice of marital 
status is indeed not a random event. Thus, several effects that have already been identified can explain on 
a non-mutually exclusive basis differences in the division of labour in couples according to marital status: 
 The “observable characteristics” effect refers to the effect of the self-selection of couples in the 
different types of union based on their observable characteristics. Some socioeconomic 
characteristics favour a sexual division of labour within the couple, and they can also be 
associated with a particular type of relationship. It is not then the relationship itself that 
determines the sexual division of labour, but the particular characteristics of these couples.22 
 The “values” effect (non-observable characteristics) refers to the effect of the self-selection of 
couples based on the values that they hold. Given comparable profiles, couples opt for a form of 
union because of the values that they share with regard to gender norms in particular23.  
 The “marital status” effect refers to the causal effect between the choice of the type of union and 
the degree of the sexual division of labour within the couple. This effect is undetermined a priori. 
 
The OLS estimate cannot be used for the identification of these different effects. 
The difference in the sexual division of labour based on marital status obtained by the OLS method can be 
represented as follows: 
𝐸(𝑦𝑖1|𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 1) −  𝐸(𝑦𝑖0|𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 0)�������������������������
𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑
= 
 (𝐸(𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦𝑖0|𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 1)���������������
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 +  (𝐸(𝑦𝑖0|𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 1) − 𝐸(𝑦𝑖0 |𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 0)�������������������������𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑓−𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑖𝑎𝑠 (𝑥 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠+𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡)   
 𝑦𝑖𝑗 is the share of the core domestic work performed by the woman in the couple i. The index 𝑖 designates 
the couple and 𝑗 ∈ 0,1 determines the type of couple; 0 for cohabiting or civil partnership couples and 1 
for married couples. The variable 𝑚𝑎𝑟 designates the treatment, in this case the marriage event, which 
equals 1 if the couple was married and 0 if not.  
The matching method is used to associate with each married couple one or more non-married couples who 
have similar socio-economic characteristics. The basic identification assumption underlying the matching 
method is based on unconfoundness conditional independence: if we assume that there exists a vector of 
observable characteristics 𝑥𝑖 that captures the self-selection bias, thus conditionally on 𝑥𝑖, then passing 
through the “marriage” treatment regardless of the type of couples is random: 𝑦𝑖0 ⊥ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖|𝑥𝑖  
                                                          
22 For example, the sexual division of labour within the couple is greater when both partners have a low level of education (see 
descriptive statistics) and, likewise, less educated couples are more likely to marry, in which case it is not the marriage per se that 
creates the unequal division of labour, but rather the level of education of the two partners. 
23 Couples with egalitarian values may be more inclined towards civil partnerships, and couples with less egalitarian or more 
conservative values with respect to the male breadwinner model might more easily opt for marriage, irrespective of their socio-
economic characteristics. 
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This implies that: 𝐸(𝑦𝑖0|𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 1, 𝑥𝑖) = 𝐸(𝑦𝑖0|𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 0, 𝑥𝑖) 
The share of domestic work performed by the woman in married couples is compared with what would 
have prevailed if these couples were not married. A pairing between married and unmarried couples 
(cohabiting or in civil partnerships for the 2009-10 survey) starting from the same characteristics would 
make it possible to build a perfect counterfactual. In practice, this matching is not feasible. The matching 
problem is reduced to a single dimension; a “propensity score matching” is estimated (Rosenbaum and 
Rubin, 1983): 
𝑝(𝑥𝑖) = Pr (𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) ∈ [0,1] 
This propensity score verifies an important theoretical property: a “Balancing Score”:       𝑥 ⊥ 𝑚𝑎𝑟|𝑝(𝑥) 
The conditional distribution of x knowing p(x) is orthogonal to the choice of marital status. This property 
implies that within subgroups of couples who have the same propensity scores p(x), the distribution of x 
should be identical between the different types of couples, regardless of marital status. 
Once conditioned on the propensity score, and given the hypothesis of conditional independence, the 
independence between the sexual division of labour and the choice of marital status is also satisfied:  
   𝑦𝑖0 ⊥ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖|𝑥𝑖 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠�⎯⎯⎯⎯�  𝑦𝑖0 ⊥ 𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖|𝑝(𝑥𝑖) 
The probability of marrying is estimated over all couples. The distributions of this score for the married 
couples and the cohabiting couples (and civil partnerships for 2009-10) are compared. Only couples with a 
common support of distributions are retained in the estimates24. The matching is then performed between 
the married and unmarried couples (cohabiting or civil partners) who have identical propensity scores. The 
results presented below are based on the “Epanechnikov Kernel matching method”: every married couple 
is paired with all the unmarried couples weighted by their distance in terms of the propensity score25. A 
counterfactual is thus obtained for each married couple: 
𝑦�𝑖0 = 1𝑛0  � 𝑤𝑖′𝑦𝑖′  ,      ∀ 𝑖 ≠ 𝑖′
𝑖′|𝑚𝑎𝑟=0  
where    𝑤𝑖′ = Κ((p(𝑥𝑖′)−𝑝(𝑥𝑖)|ℎ)∑ Κ(�𝑝(𝑥𝑖′)−𝑝(𝑥𝑖)|ℎ�)𝑖′|𝑚𝑎𝑟=0                      (Κ:𝐸𝑝𝑎𝑛𝑒𝑐ℎ𝑛𝑖𝑘𝑜𝑣 𝐾𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑒𝑙) 
The share of domestic work performed by the woman in each married couple is compared with that of the 
counterfactual: 
                                                          
24 The hypothesis of conditional independence is also verified before carrying out the matching process. 
25 Robustness tests based on other methods were also carried out, but are not presented here. 
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Δ�⏟
𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑡𝑢𝑠 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 + 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 𝑒𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 = 1𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟  � (𝑦𝑖1 − 𝑦�𝑖0)𝑛𝑚𝑎𝑟𝑖=1  
Using this procedure, the estimated differences in the distribution of tasks between the different forms of 
union cannot result from the self-selection of the couples with respect to their observable characteristics. 
These differences could be interpreted as the result of differences in unobserved characteristics, such as 
values. The “values” effect would then explain that more egalitarian couples tend to be concentrated in a 
particular type of union. This method does not take account of the cause-and-effect relationship between 
the type of union and the degree of the sexual division of labour within the couple. A causal effect of 
“marital status” on the distribution of domestic work can be inferred only if it is possible to add the 
“values with respect to equality” dimension in the matching. But the data available do not provide any 
information on that point. Table 4 shows the results of the matching method and compares these with the 
results obtained using the OLS method. 
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Marriage/Cohabiting Marriage/Civil partners
1985-86 1998-99
-1.26 -3.48*** -0.52 -4.54**
(0.012) (0.011) (0.011) (0.018)
3334 2715 2873 2873
3091/243 2201/514 2013/683 2013/178
Matching -0.2 -5.9** -0.1 -8.6**
(0.015) (0.019) (0.016) (0.036)
2913 1802 1907 1644
2730/183 1553/249 1459/448 1504/140
Notes: The values are expressed in percentage points.
*** significance at threshold of 1%, ** at threshold of 5% and * at threshold of 10%.
§ Standard errors are obtained by bootstrapping for the matching pairs model.
2009-10
LOS
Obs. (couples)
Obs. (couples)
Table 4 : Estimated difference in the share of domestic work performed by the woman based on marital status (standa     
Model Marriage/Cohabiting
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For the 1985-86 time-use survey, on a sample of 2730 married couples and 183 cohabiting couples, the 
share of domestic work performed by the woman is not affected by the fact that she is cohabiting. This can 
be explained by the fact that in the early 1980s, cohabitation was still a marginal practice and resembled a 
“prelude to marriage” or a “pre-marriage test”. The sexual division of labour preceded the formalization of 
the union either because the couples anticipated in their organization that they were going to marry, or 
because once specialization had been established they wound up marrying (Villeneuve-Gokalp, 1990). 
Thus no significant difference in terms of the sexual division of labour was observed between the two 
types of union. 
For the 1998-99 time-use survey, the sample was reduced to 1802 couples (1553 married and 
249 cohabiting) by excluding couples without a common support for the characteristics on which the 
matching was performed. The result for 1998-99 indicates a significant effect26: the domestic work 
performed by married women would have been 5.9 percentage points lower if these women were 
cohabiting. This result confirms the result obtained using the OLS method (with which the effect is about 
3.5 percentage points). In the late 1990s, cohabitation was spreading as a socially accepted alternative to 
marriage. Couples were stabilizing their relationship outside marriage, and the arrival of children did not 
lead them to formalize their union (Toulemon, 1996). The sexual division of labour in these couples is 
more egalitarian than what occurs in married couples, and this is not due to the particular profile of these 
couples in terms of their demographics. The “values” effect may explain this gap: cohabitation in the 
1990s attracted people who were looking for a type of union that differed from marriage’s conservative 
norms and reflected egalitarian values. To this could be added a potential “marital status” effect, although 
the direction of the relationship cannot be clarified: it is possible that marriage reinforces the degree of the 
sexual division of labour within couples, or that couples who anticipate such specialization opt for this 
type of union. Barg and Beblo (2012) also found that German married couples are more unequal than 
cohabiting couples. Panel data from 1991 to 2008 allowed them to identify the direction of causality of the 
“marital status” effect: German couples were specializing before marriage, but marriage then increased the 
degree of specialization. 
For the 2009-10 time-use survey, the results also confirm those obtained using the OLS method: no 
significant difference in terms of the sexual division of labour is apparent between married couples and 
cohabiting couples. Thus, contrary to what was observed for 1998-99, cohabiting couples were not more 
egalitarian than married couples with respect to the distribution of domestic work. In contrast, in couples 
in civil partnerships, the share of domestic work performed by the woman was significantly lower (about 
8.6 percentage points) 27 than the share observed in married couples, with a sample of 1504 married 
couples and 140 civil partnerships (the difference is 4.5 percentage points, which is then greater than that 
obtained by the OLS method). Civil partnerships had become more widespread and now represent an 
institutionalized type of union, in particular giving a right to joint taxation and offering an alternative to 
marriage. The division of labour in couples in civil partnerships is less unequal than in cohabiting and 
married couples. It is possible that these differences are due to a “marital status” effect: couples in civil 
                                                          
26 A standard error of 0.019.  The standard errors are obtained using bootstrapping.   
27 Standard error of 0.036. 
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partnerships specialize less than married couples because this form of union is less regulated, or married 
couples specialize more because of the greater protection associated with marriage. But this “marital 
status” effect does not explain the case of cohabiting couples, who specialize in the same proportions as 
married couples, even though this form of union is not regulated. The “values” effect offers a more likely 
interpretation for the convergence of these two types of couples with regard to the sexual division of 
labour. Married couples hold conservative values less than before, so that the value effect no longer comes 
into play between married couples and cohabiting couples, but the division of tasks still remains unequal 
in these two types of union. Meanwhile, couples holding egalitarian values are, all else being equal, 
attracted by civil partnerships, whereas before these were institutionalized they opted for cohabitation. 
These interpretations merit being refined by using longitudinal data. The duration of the unions is not 
observed in the data used, nor are any transitions from one type of union to another. Yet a couple’s 
behaviour with respect to the division of labour is likely to vary according to the duration of the union, the 
marital past of the partners and also the age when the partners became a couple. The “Decisions in the 
couples” module can nevertheless be used to take account of the duration of the union observed for 2009-
10, with no change in the result.    
3. Conclusion 
This article complements the literature on the sharing of domestic tasks according to the marital status of 
couples in the case of France. Cohabitation, which in the 1980s was still seen as a prelude to marriage, has 
now become widespread as a long-term, socially accepted alternative to marriage. The sexual division of 
labour has become more equal for married couples, and remained stable for cohabiting couples. In 2009-
10, the sexual division of labour in cohabiting couples was similar to that observed in married couples 
(72% and 73.5%). Couples in civil partnerships were more egalitarian than other couples in the way they 
organize domestic chores (65.1% of the domestic work is done by the woman). 
Econometric estimates indicate that this difference is not the result of the self-selection of the couples in 
terms of their observable characteristics, but more a “values” effect: the couples opting for civil 
partnerships hold more egalitarian values that couples opting for the other two forms of union. Once more 
unequal, today couples in marriages organize themselves along the same lines as cohabiting couples, but 
on the basis of a distribution that remains unfavourable to women. 
The sexual division of labour persists, and has not dissolved with the growth of cohabitation. The French 
social welfare state has not been overhauled around a new model of the couple, and still lies between the 
two models. The first centres on marriage, with the patriarchal symbolism that this embodies, and the 
protections and transfers associated with it. It encourages at least in part a gendered division of roles, and 
it attracts couples with more conservative values. It is accompanied by safeguards for the wife in case of a 
separation (compensatory allowance, derivative social rights). The second model is centred on 
cohabitation, which does not take account of the weight of gender norms and the persistence of the sexual 
division of labour in the family. The PACS civil partnership, established in 1999, provides only a partial 
answer in terms of regulation, but to the extent that this form of union attracts couples holding egalitarian 
values, the consequences in terms of reducing gender inequality are limited. The gap between gendered 
behaviours in the distribution of domestic work and the choice of marital status poses a risk for cohabiting 
women, as is suggested by Martin and Théry (2001). 
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5. Annexes 
Annex 1: Breakdown of activities included in the scope of core domestic work  
Table A1: Nomenclature of the domestic activities 
 
 
 Kitchen Dishes Laundry Tidying Management 
1985-86 311 - 
Preparing 
and 
cooking 
food 
312 - 
Peeling 
fruit and 
vegetables 
313 - Dishwashing 
(incl. drying) 
314 – Putting 
away dishes 
(including laying 
and clearing the 
table) 
315 – Serving 
meals, drinks, 
coffee, etc.  
 
331 – Washing clothes (incl. 
sorting, putting in and out of 
machine, hanging) 
332 – Ironing laundry 
334 – Putting away clothes, 
sports bags, etc.  
 
321 – House cleaning (sweeping, 
mopping) 
322 – Making the beds 
323 – Tidying a room 
341 – Outdoor cleaning 
(sidewalk, rubbish), heavy 
housework 
345 – Putting shopping away, 
loading or unloading the car at 
home 
 
343 – Misc. (e.g. doing the 
accounts, entries, filing 
paperwork or arranging books) 
361 – Office and 
administrative tasks 
348 - Activities linked to 
events, i.e. accidents, 
burglaries, fire, flood, etc.  
 
1999-98 311 - 
Preparing 
and 
cooking 
food, 
peeling 
314 – 
Making 
jam, cakes, 
etc. 
 
312 -  
Dishwashing, 
putting dishes 
away 
313 - Clearing the 
table, serving the 
meal 
 
331 - Washing clothes 
(incl.sorting, putting in or out 
of the washing machine, 
hanging, folding, etc.) 
332 - Ironing 
335 – Putting away clothes, 
preparing one’s bag 
 
321 – Tidying and storing (incl. 
putting away shopping): washing, 
mopping, making / unmaking 
beds, preparing the linen, tidying 
a room, etc. 
322 – Putting away shopping 
 
342 - Doing the account, 
entries, administrative work, 
including paperwork for the 
banks, utilities, etc. (incl. any 
related phone calls) 
361 – Administrative or office 
tasks, including waiting on and 
queueing for administrative 
tasks  
369 – Administrative tasks for 
another household 
 
2009-10 311 - 
Preparing 
and 
cooking 
food, 
peeling 
 
312 - Washing + 
putting away 
dishes, clearing 
the table 
313 – Setting the 
table, serving the 
meal 
 
331 - Washing clothes (incl. 
sorting, putting in or out of the 
washing machine, hanging) 
332 – Ironing 
335 – Putting away clothes, 
preparing one’s bag, luggage 
 
322 – Putting away shopping, 
loading and unloading the car 
323 – Outdoor tidying and 
cleaning 
324 – Indoor tidying and cleaning 
 
342 – Household management: 
doing the accounts, 
administrative mail 
361 – Recourse to 
administrative services (banks, 
lawyers, administrative tasks 
such as social security, etc.), 
excluding job searches 
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 Household trips Child care Care for adults Miscellaneous 
1985-86 821 – On foot  
822 – By car (incl. getting to 
car, finding a parking place, 
closing and opening it) 
823 – By motor or push bike  
824 – On public transport 
825 - Other 
 
411 – Nursing and care 
for infants (up to age 1) 
412 – Care for older 
children (from age 1 to 
about 14) 
413 – Medical care 
outside the home (visits 
to the doctor, dentist, or 
other healthcare for 
children outside the 
home, incl. waiting 
time) 
414 – Home health care 
421 – Monitoring 
school lessons and 
homework 
431 – Personal or 
health care: 
aiding them to 
get up, to wash, 
to eat, to bathe 
432 – Misc. 
(packing 
luggage) 
 
342 – Cleaning and 
supplies for heating 
and water (incl. 
lighting fires)  
347 - Moving  
344 – Opening and 
closing shutters, 
entering or leaving 
the garage in the car  
346 – Looking for or 
doing something in 
the basement, attic, 
garage, etc. 
349 – Chasing out 
any intruders, 
ensuring home 
security  
 
1999-98 813 – Trips for children  
819 – Trips for another 
household 
 
411 – Child care 
includes: giving a 
bottle, changing a 
child’s clothes, etc. All 
non-medical care for 
the children 
412 – Medical care for 
children outside the 
home includes:
 visits to 
doctors, dentists, 
physiotherapists, etc.
  
413 – Health care for 
children at home 
421 – Monitoring 
lessons and homework 
 
431 – Personal or 
medical care for 
adults, including 
helping them to 
get up, to wash, 
to eat, to bathe, 
etc. 
441 Other care 
for family 
members 
 
341 – Maintenance of 
heating, water 
(chopping wood, 
loading coal, lighting 
fires) 
343 – Other 
uncategorized 
household activities 
incl. opening and 
closing shutters, 
putting the car in or 
out of the garage, etc. 
344 – Moving 
 
2009-10 813 – Trips related to children 
819 – Trips for another 
household 
 
411 – Taking care of 
one’s children (excl. 
health care) 
412 – Accompanying 
or waiting for one’s 
children (excl. trips) 
413 – Health care at 
home for one’s children 
419 – Taking care of 
another household’s 
children (incl. 
accompaniment, health 
care, hugs, etc.) 
421 – Monitoring 
schoolwork 
 
431 – Care for 
adults in the 
household: help 
with personal or 
physiological 
activities (toilet, 
meals, dressing) 
433 – Other help 
for an adult in the 
household 
439 – Care for 
adults in another 
household 
 
341 -Heating, water 
(chopping wood, 
storing coal, lighting 
fires) 
343 – Other 
household 
maintenance 
activities 
344 – Moving house 
(excl. professionally) 
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Annex 2: Descriptive statistics of the sample  
 
Source: Time-use surveys, 1985-86, 1998-99, 2009-10, INSEE. 
Scope: Cohabiting couples in which the two members have filled out their diaries and at least one of the 
members is in the workforce. 
Note: only a cross-section of the marital status is observed; it is nevertheless possible to have more detailed 
information about the marital past of couples who are cohabiting or in civil partnerships through individual 
declarations of legal marital status. Cohabiting couples are defined as those who live together but are not married 
or civil partners. Cross-checking these couples with the legal marital status reported by the two individuals who 
make up the couple makes it possible to identify four types of individuals who cohabit: those who have “never 
married” if they declare their marital status to be “single”; those who are “divorced”; those who are “widowed”; 
and those who are “married with another person, but not living together”, if they report being married. The same 
crosschecking of variables is performed for couples in civil partnerships. 
Table A2.1 : Marital past of individuals based on the type of union, by survey
Married couples
3091
93%
Never 
married Divorced Widowed 
Married with another person, 
not living together
164 75 2 2
74% 31% 1% 1%
163 69 7 4
67% 28% 3% 2%
2240
81%
Never 
married Divorced Widowed 
Married with another person, 
not living together
401 105 7 8
77% 20% 1% 2%
409 95 16 1
79% 18% 3% 0%
2014
70,05%
Never 
married Divorced Widowed 
Married with another person, 
not living together
Never 
married Divorced
600 72 11 171 7
88% 11% 2% 96% 4%
598 73 4 8 171 7
88% 11% 1% 1% 96% 4%
Cohabiting couples Civil partners
1985-1986 survey
243
7%
1998-1999 survey
521
19%
Men 
Women 
Men
Women 
Men -
Women 
2009-2010 survey
683
23,76%
178
6,19%
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Table A2.2: Characteristics of individuals and households based on the type of union, by survey
Marriage Cohabitation Marriage  Cohabitation Marriage Cohabitation Civil prtnrshp
 Inactive man 1% 2% nd nd 0% 0% 1%
 Inactive woman 33% 17% 22% 12% 13% 9% 8%
 Part-time man 4% 5% 1% 2% 2% 2% 3%
 Part-time woman 14% 11% 12% 11% 12% 12% 11%
 Unemployed man 3% 8% 4% 9% 5% 9% 6%
 Unemployed woman 3% 10% 7% 12% 5% 8% 3%
 Bargaining power nd nd -15% -9% -10% -7% -9%
 Man w/o high school 75% 67% 66% 60% 52% 57% 31%
 Woman w/o high 
school 74% 61% 62% 56% 41% 42% 20%
 Man w/ high school 
diploma 12% 12% 11% 13% 9% 9% 11%
 Woman w/ high school 
diploma 12% 17% 14% 13% 14% 13% 8%
 Man w/ high school 
plus 13% 21% 23% 27% 39% 34% 58%
 Woman w/ high school 
plus 15% 22% 23% 31% 46% 45% 72%
 Average age of the 2 
partners in years 38           33                41            36               42            37              34                  
 Age difference 2             2                 2             2                 2             2                2                   
 No. of dependent 
children 1,7          1,0               1,7           1,2              1,7           1,3              1,1                 
 Washing dishes 42% 25% 63% 40% 80% 58% 73%
 Washing clothes 98% 95% 99% 97% 100% 98% 99%
 Presence of children < 
3 yrs 23% 28% 15% 25% 14% 20% 34%
 % of couples living in 
rural area 29% 18% 30% 22% 30% 30% 23%
 Total domestic work 
time performed by the 2 
partners (minutes/week) 343         284              306          282             291          281             299                
 Share of domestic 
work performed by the 
woman 81% 75% 82% 75% 73% 72% 65%
 Characteristics of the household 
 Individual characteristics 
1985-1998 1998-1999 2009-2010
Characteristics of members of the couple related to the labour market
2014 683 178Total no.  of couples 3091 243 2240 521
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Annex 3: Prediction of hourly wages for women and for men 
Equations for hourly wages were estimated28 for the women and men in the sample used29. The 
estimation of the wage equations takes into account the effect of selection on the labour market using 
Heckman’s method (1979). This simultaneously estimates the equation for the wage and for 
participation in the labour market. For the calculation of bargaining power, the wages predicted, based 
on the estimated wage equations, were assigned to individuals for whom the salary was not observed 
(unemployment or inactivity, or when the pay field was not filled in). The observed wage was used for 
everyone else. 
Results of the estimation of the wage equations and of selection on the labour market 
Wage equation: ln(𝑤𝑖) = 𝑥𝑖1𝛽1 + 𝜀𝑖1 
𝑤 is the hourly wage, the index 𝑖 designates the individual and 𝑥𝑖1 the vector of the control 
variables: potential experience and its square, potential experience30 and its square multiplied by the 
number of children in the household, and the number of children in the household. These last three 
variables are used in the estimation of the woman’s wage so as to account for career breaks. The 
diploma obtained (less than high school Bac diploma, high school Bac, above Bac), the type of union 
(marriage, civil partnerships, cohabitation), and residence in a rural area. 𝛽1 is the vector of the 
corresponding coefficients and 𝜀𝑖1 is the error term. 
Selection equation: 𝑠𝑖∗ = 𝑥𝑖2𝛽2 +  𝜀𝑖2  
For the selection equation, the latent variable 𝑠𝑖∗ is not observed, it determines the selection 
(employment) on the labour market, and so we use an observable variable that is defined as follows: 
𝑠𝑖 = 1(𝑠𝑖∗ > 0), or 1(. ) is the usual indicator function. Hence the probability of working versus the 
fact of being unemployed or inactive: Pr(𝑠𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖2) = Pr (𝑠𝑖∗ > 0) 
𝑥𝑖2 is the vector of control variables that contains the variables used in the wage equation 𝑥𝑖1 + the 
exclusion variables 𝑧𝑖 : the existence of an unearned income (interest, savings income, dividends). For 
women, variables are introduced relating to the presence of children under age 3 and age 3 to 6 and the 
partner’s educational diploma. 𝛽2 defines the vector of corresponding coefficients and 𝜀𝑖2  is the error 
term. The error terms of the two equations 𝜀1 and 𝜀2  follow a normal joint distribution, with zero 
mean and a variance-covariance matrix Σ. For identification purposes the variance of 𝜀2 is normalized 
to 1. The reference person is a married woman / man, with less than a Bac diploma, living in an urban 
area. The results are interpreted in relation to this reference. 
                                                          
28 As the objective is to build a variable measuring the woman's bargaining power in the couple, it was essential to predict the 
wages of the men (even if their actual wage is observed). The estimation of the wage often leads to smoothing and to reducing 
the wage variance in the sample. Relying on the predicted earnings of the women and the observed earnings of the men would 
result in an inaccurate measurement of the relative wages of the two partners, and thus of their bargaining power. 
29 The size of the sample is not the same in the wage equations as in the estimation, because of missing data on the dependent 
variable denoting the share of core domestic work performed by the woman in the couple. 
30 Difference between the age and the age upon completion of studies. 
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Source: Time-use surveys, 2009-10, INSEE. 
Scope: Cohabiting couples in which both members have filled in the diaries and at least one of the partners is in 
the workforce. 
Table A3 Estimation wage equations for the women and for the men
Coef. Std. dev. Coef. Std. dev.
Prof. experience 0,023*** 0,007 0,023*** 0,004
Prof. experience² 0,000** 0 0,000*** 0
Prof. experience x no.  of children in 
household 0,002 0,005
Prof. experience² x no. of children in 
household 0 0
No.  of children -0,075* 0,044 -0,013 0,009
High school dip. (ref. less than HSD) 0,119*** 0,031 0,233*** 0,033
High school dip. or more (ref. less than HSD) 0,310*** 0,026 0,290*** 0,023
Civil partners (ref: marriage) -0,015 0,046 0,008 0,041
Cohabiting (ref: marriage) -0,017 0,025 -0,086*** 0,023
Rural area -0,014 0,022 -0,052*** 0,021
Constant 1,725 0,067 1,890*** 0,051
Total individuals
Prof. experience 0,024 0,016 -0,026** 0,012
Prof. experience² -0,001* 0 0 0
Professional experience x no. of children in 
the household -0,004 0,009
Prof. experience² x no.  of children in the 
household 0 0
No.  of children -0,133 0,099 -0,075*** 0,022
Presence of children aged 3 to 6 -0,108*** 0,052
Presence of children  < 3 yrs -0,184*** 0,063
High school dip. (ref. less than HSD) 0,076 0,077 0,129 0,091
High school diploma or more (ref: less than HS-0,197*** 0,062 -0,304*** 0,062
Partner HSD (ref: less than HSD) 0,035 0,077 -0,1 0,065
Partner HSD or more (ref : less than HSD) -0,157*** 0,051 -0,136*** 0,053
Civil partners (ref: marriage) -0,058 0,102 -0,045 0,104
Cohabiting (ref: marriage) 0,073 0,06 -0,124*** 0,06
Rural area 0,061 0,053 -0,144*** 0,053
Non-wage income 0,02 0,044 -0,027 0,043
Constant 0,457 0,151 1,21 0,136
Correlation (wage, employment) ρ 0,749 0,028 0,82 0,019
LR indépendance test of equations (ρ=0)
Log likelihood
Total non-censored individuals
*** Significance at threshold of 1%, ** at threshold of 5% 
1729 2027
Chi2(1) =    51,91 Chi2(1) =    94,00
Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000 Prob > Chi2 = 0.0000
-2651.497 -2561.409
Women Men
Equation (log) of hourly wage
2902 2903
Equation of employment
